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A popular theory of value change states that “postmaterialistic” values such as eman-
cipation and personal development are steadily replacing traditional “materialistic” 
values such as social advancement and economic security as a result of the ongoing 
improvement of living conditions since the Second World War. Post-materialism is 
thus seen as a phenomenon directly linked to economic affluence.   
Based on the Socio-Economic Panel data, it can be shown that between 1986 and 
2006, the percentage of individuals displaying a postmaterialistic value orientation 
has risen among West Germans. Surprisingly, East Germans have become distinctly 
more postmaterialistic in the last ten years, and have virtually reached the West 
German level. In general, each generation tends to be somewhat more postmateria-
listic than the one before. Particularly postmaterialistic population groups are the 
self-employed, people with a high level of education, and Alliance 90/Green Party 
supporters.
An analysis of value orientations within families shows that adult siblings display 
strong similarities to one another with regard to their values, which suggests a pro-
cess of value formation taking place during childhood and adolescence. The results 
also show that it is not the economic situation in parental households but rather the 
parents’ value orientations that most crucially shape their children’s values. 
The theory of postmaterialistic value change was formulated by American political 
scientist Ronald Inglehart in the wake of the sweeping societal changes of the early 
1970s.1 It states that the vast improvement in economic living conditions in many 
western democracies since the end of the Second World War has resulted in the re-
placement of traditional “materialistic” values, with new “postmaterialistic” values. 
Inglehart regards materialistic values as being expressed by an individual emphasis 
on security, social advancement, and prestige, while postmaterialistic values em-
phasize self-development, quality of life, emancipation, and civic participation. 
1 Cf. Inglehart, R.: The Silent Revolution in Europe: Intergenerational Change in Post-Industrial Societies. American 
Political Science Review 65, 1971, 991–1017; Inglehart, R.: The Silent Revolution: Changing Values and Political 
Styles among Western Publics. Princeton 1977; Inglehart, R.: Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Econo-
mic and Political Change in 43 Societies. Princeton 1997; Inglehart, R., Welzel, C.: Modernization, Cultural Change and 
Democracy. Princeton 2005.Value Change: More and More Germans Showing a Postmaterialistic Orientation
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The social and political consequences identified 
as resulting from this value change are significant, 
starting from the student protests of 1968, through 
the growing environmental, women’s, and peace 
movements, and on to the founding of the Green 
Party. At the same time, cohabitation and attitudes 
toward work have also been influenced by value 
change. Labor market participation no longer fo-
cuses solely on securing a living, but increasingly 
on the opportunities available for professional de-
velopment and individual advancement. The the-
ory of postmaterialistic value change assumes its 
occurrence with a time lag of one generation and 
not simultaneously with the increase in affluence. 
According to the theory, people who grow up in 
economically or politically uncertain times remain 
materialists throughout their lives and those who 
experience economic excess and security during 
their childhood and adolescence advocate postma-
terialistic values in their lives. Therefore, the newly 
established security and the economic wonder of the 
1950s were only expressed in the social changes du-
ring the 1970s. According to Inglehart, value change 
does not take place through individual change of 
opinion, but rather, through the constant moving 
up of birth years with new values, which influence 
majority opinion little by little. 
“Maintaining order” versus “freedom of 
speech”
Values of materialism and postmaterialism were sur-
veyed in the Socio-Economic Panel Study (SOEP) 
carried out by DIW Berlin, in cooperation with In-
fratest Sozialforschung in 1986, 1996 and 2006, 
using the standard survey instruments developed by 
Inglehart.2 Those surveyed are asked to rank the four 
possible goals of state action “maintaining order 
in the nation”, “fighting rising prices”, “protecting 
freedom of speech” and “giving people more say 
in important government decisions”, according to 
individually perceived importance. If those surve-
yed give preference to the first two political goals 
over the last two, in terms of importance, they are 
classified as materialists. If they give preference to 
the last two political goals, they are described as 
postmaterialists.3
2 Cf. Frick, J. et al.: 25 Wellen Sozio-oekonomisches Panel. Vierteljahrs-
hefte zur Wirtschaftsforschung of DIW Berlin, No. 3/2008. 
3 The assumption that the ranking of the political goals provides infor-
mation about the orientation of those surveyed toward materialism/
postmaterialism  is  shared  in  a  large  part  of  social  science  literature; 
however, it is not without criticism. It is argued that “fighting rising pri-
ces” depends on the relevant inflation rate and is therefore unsuitable 
for measuring stable value orientations, cf. Clarke, H. D., Dutt, N.: Mea-
suring Value Change in Western Industrialized Societies: The Impact of 
Unemployment. American Political Science Review 85, 1991, 905–920. 
Furthermore, it is criticised that the goals “protection freedom of speech” 
and “giving people more say in important government decisions” are in-
dicators of democratic standards and not the postmaterialism concept 
In West Germany, the share of postmaterialists has 
risen during the past twenty years, from 38 to 47 
percent, whereby the emphasis on postmaterialistic 
values was slightly lower in the mid-1990s than in 
the mid-1980s (Figure 1).4 
In East Germany, a distinct increase in postmate-
rialism, virtually to the West German level, can be 
identified between 1996 and 2006: In just ten years, 
the share of postmaterialists doubled from 22 to 45 
percent. This comparably rapid development cannot 
be explained entirely by generational replacement in 
the newly-formed German states, and it indicates a 
periodic effect that contests Inglehart’s theory of va-
lue change. The strong emphasis on material needs 
and security in East Germany in the mid-1990s was 
presumably a result of the economic collapse and 
system transformation. Ten years later, East Ger-
mans supported the postmaterialistic goals of free 
expression of opinion and political co-determination 
to a similar extent as individuals from the former 
West German states.
Figure 2 reflects the deviation in proportions of 
postmaterialists from the average for different birth 
cohorts. The spread of materialism/postmaterialism 
within the birth cohorts is highly stable over the 
twenty year period. This finding, which applies 
equally to all groups of cohorts, indicates that people 
do not change their values systematically in a parti-
cular direction over the life course, as conventional 
life course theories such as “aging conservatism” 
within Inglehart’s meaning. 
4 The trend toward postmaterialism can be observed in West Germany, 
as well as in other Western European societies on the basis of Eurobaro-
meter data and general population surveys since the early 70s. 
Figure 1
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would expect.5 For example, the generation born 
between 1960 and 1969 is comprised of an above-
average number of postmaterialists, both at the age 
of 20 (survey year 1986) and at the age of 40 (survey 
year 2006). Similarly, the share of postmaterialists 
in the generation born between 1910 and 1919 is 
around 20 percentage points lower than the average, 
both at the age of around 70 (survey year 1986) and 
at the age of 90 (survey year 2006).
It is also noticeable that each generation studied is 
more postmaterialistic than the preceding one. The 
clearest changes in the shift from materialistic va-
lues to postmaterialistic values are in the shift from 
the war generation (born up to 1929) to the post-war 
generation (born 1930 to 1949) and later generations 
(born since 1950). This result largely corresponds 
to the forecasts by the theory of postmaterialistic 
value change. The births since 1950 tend to differ 
less widely in West Germany with respect to the 
proportion of postmaterialists.6
Postmaterialism in Different Groups of the 
Society
The previous results indicate that the population is 
becoming increasingly postmaterialistic with each 
successive generation. To an increasing extent, per-
sonal development and social emancipation are seen 
as being more important than social advancement 
and economic security. Table 1 shows the propor-
tion of postmaterialists in various groups of the 
population in 2006. 
When looking at occupational status, we see an 
above-average share of post-materialists among the 
self-employed and management executives (each 
above 55 percent). A below-average share can be 
seen for laborers (44 percent). In line with the fin-
dings by birth cohorts, pensioners are particularly 
materialistic (68 percent) and persons in education 
are particularly postmaterialistic (60 percent).  
Furthermore, a relationship is seen between postma-
terialism and education: the higher the educational 
degree, the higher the share of postmaterialists (56 
percent for high school graduates). Only a weak 
relationship is found for income. The twenty per-
cent of the population with the highest household 
income―the upper income quintile―is compri-
sed of the highest share of postmaterialists, at 50 
5 Cf., e.g., Glenn, N. D.: Aging and Conservatism. Annals of the American 
Academy of Political and Social Science 415, 1974, 176–186.
6 When looking at West and East Germany separately, the findings show 
each new birth year is more post-materialistic than the previous one on 
average in East Germany as in West Germany. However, the clearest dif-
ference between two subsequent generations occurs somewhat later in 
the East, between 1950/1959 and 1960/1969.
percent. Among recipients of Hartz IV, the share 
of postmaterialists is significantly higher than the 
average of the population. However, it should also 
be noted that the average recipients of Hartz IV are 
younger working-age persons. 
With regard to marital status, the share of postmate-
rialists in non-married partnerships is higher, at 55 
percent, than in married partnerships, at 43 percent. 
The strongest difference in the share of materialists 
and postmaterialists is related to individual party 
affiliation. A distinct majority of Alliance 90/Green 
Party supporters are postmaterialists (74 percent), 
while a distinct majority of CDU/CSU voters are 
materialists (65 percent).
If we replicate our analysis of postmaterialism in 
various population groups based on data gathered 
in 1986 in West Germany (not documented in the 
form of a table), a very similar distribution is found 
as in the 2006 data for Germany as a whole, but at 
a lower level. In individual areas, the differences 
have even declined between the population groups. 
For example, the share of postmaterialists among 
persons with an elementary school/primary school 
diploma was 30 percent in 1986, compared with 62 
Figure  2
Persons with Postmaterialistic Values by 
Birth Cohorts
Deviations from the average in percentage points
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percent for those with a university entrance quali-
fication. The difference between Green Party sup-
porters and supporters of the Christian Democrats 
was still 81 to 25 percent in 1986, compared with 
74 to 35 percent in 2006.  
In general it can be said that differences between 
population groups can be identified according to 
occupational status, marital status, and income, but 
these differences are moderate and therefore do not 
indicate an value change exclusively in specific 
social structural groups. 
How formative are experiences during 
adolescence for individual values?
A central hypothesis of the theory of postmateria-
listic value change is the formation of values duri-
ng childhood and adolescence, whereby Inglehart 
emphasizes the significance of the economic envi-
ronment during adolescence for the development of 
materialistic/postmaterialistic values. 
A conventional method of assessing the influence of 
experiences during adolescence on later individual 
attitudes and conduct lies in the investigation of 
siblings. To the degree that adult siblings are more 
similar in terms of their values than purely randomly 
selected persons, it can be concluded that value for-
mation results from commonalities between siblings 
during their childhood and adolescence. In fact, 
data on families surveyed in the SOEP show that 
the tendency toward materialism/postmaterialism 
is also shared over the long term by the majority 
of the 948 adult siblings studied. But what types of 
common experiences lead to the high similarity in 
values between siblings? 
Inglehart argues that experiences of economic scar-
city during childhood and adolescence lead to the 
formation of materialistic values, while experiences 
of affluence lead to postmaterialistic values. In Table 
2, the change in individual probability of advoca-
ting materialistic values rather than postmaterialistic 
values is portrayed in dependence on the parental 
employment and income situations. While the value 
orientations was measured by the SOEP for respon-
dents as adults, the parental characteristics relate to 
a point in time when those surveyed were around the 
age of 15. Here, we look at parental unemployment, 
income poverty, and the receipt of social benefits.
In the case of unemployment and poverty, the po-
sitive effect identified corresponds to the expecta-
tions. The probability of being a materialist as an 
adult rises by seven respectively three percent, if 
the person grows up in poverty or in a household 
with unemployed parents. Under consideration of 
poverty and unemployment, the probability of hol-
ding materialistic values declines somewhat in cases 
where parents have received social transfers, by 
two percent. However, it is important to note that 
none of these three effects lie within the realm of 
statistical significance. Due to the sampling error, 
it cannot be stated with certainty that the effects 
differ from nil.  
Table 1
Postmaterialists by Occupational Status, 
Education, Income, Marital Status, and 
Party Affiliation 2006






Unskilled or non-trained workers 44
Skilled workers 44
Unskilled or non-trained employee/civil servant 47
Management employee/civil servant 55
Self-Employed, freelancers without employees 61












No receipt of Hartz IV 46









Alliance 90/Green Party 74
Die Linke.PDS/WASG 60
No party affiliation 46
Total 46
1 Without pupils and people without a school diploma.
2 Equivalence-weighted net household income.
3 Including recipients of social benefits.
4 Question in the SOEP: “Many people in Germany are inclined toward 
a certain political party, although from time to time they vote for a dif-
ferent political party. What about you: Are you inclined, generally spea-
king, toward a particular party?“ Other party affiliations not stated.
Sources: SOEP; Calculations by DIW Berlin. DIW Berlin 2008Value Change: More and More Germans Showing a Postmaterialistic Orientation
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In contrast to Inglehart’s theory of postmaterialis-
tic value change, an insecure environment during 
adolescence is not a particularly good predictor for 
materialism in adults. A parental characteristic that 
remains largely disregarded by the theory of postma-
terialistic value change, but that shows a statistically 
significant influence on the development of values 
according to this study, is the value orientation of 
the parents. Individuals whose parents advocated 
materialistic values have a 17 percent higher pro-
bability of also being materialists as adults.  
The finding that economic environment during 
childhood and adolescence has a minor influence on 
the development of postmaterialistic values appears 
to require further explanation from a theoretical 
perspective. This result appears not to correspond 
to the findings of an increase in postmaterialistic 
values among younger birth cohorts, and the high 
incidence of postmaterialistic values among people 
with above-average education and income. A pre-
carious economic situation during childhood may 
possibly not have the same meaning today that it 
did up to the Second World War due to the availa-
bility of welfare state programs. However, it is also 
possible that expansion of the educational system 
and not increasing affluence is responsible for the 
higher proportions of postmaterialism in younger 
birth cohorts. 
Another problem with Inglehart’s theory of postma-
terialistic value change is the finding of a positive 
relationship between values of the parents and their 
children. If each generation is not only influenced 
by economic conditions in the development of their 
values but also by the value orientations of their 
parents, value change does not take place in a linear 
relationship to economic development, with a time 
lag of one generation, as presumed by Inglehart.
If the majority of the parental generation has a ma-
terialistic orientation―as was the case in Germany 
for many years―but the majority of their children 
grow up in relative affluence, the value change to 
postmaterialism tends to be slower than assumed 
based on the tendency of parents to bring up and 
educate their children in a materialistic way. Howe-
ver, if the majority of a future parental generation 
itself is included among the postmaterialists and if 
the economic situation of the population also im-
proves over the long term, affluence and parental 
upbringing will both positively influence the share 
of postmaterialists in future birth cohorts. In this 
case, the value change to postmaterialism would 
take place even more quickly than economic deve-
lopment would lead us to expect. 
Conclusion
The SOEP data show that the slow change in value 
orientation that can be observed in most countries 
since the 1970s is continuing until today. However, 
the increasing share of postmaterialists cannot be 
explained exclusively by generational replacement. 
The data verify in particular a strong transmission of 
value orientations from parents to their children.  
If this trend toward postmaterialism continues, it 
will require socio-political adaptation processes. 
This form of value change will result in demands 
for politics beyond order and security, and political 
parties will be confronted increasingly with que-
stions of distributional justice and environmental 
issues as well. Employers will be required to in-
vest more in the professional development of their 
employees than in their pure monetary security. 
A social order that has previously been orientated 
toward traditional life models and role distributions 
must adapt more to the requirement for personal de-
velopment. Current efforts to improve the situation 
of professional women, the movement for equality 
of non-marital and same-sex partnerships, and the 
more intensive participation of migrants in all areas 
of social life are evidence of this development.
Table 2
Change in the Probability1 for 






Materialism of parents +17
1 The details relate to marginal effects, which were determined in a bi-
nary logit regression.
2 Data was used from 420 persons surveyed who already lived in SOEP 
households, and their values were observed as adults over a period of at 
least ten, in several cases, even 20 years. The number of observations 
amounts to 903. 
3 The equivalence-weighted net household income amounts to less than 
60 percent of the median income.
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